Global Development Agenda and Superpower Strategies (2025 Overview)

by Alec Furrier (Alexander Furrier)

United Nations Agenda 2030: Goals and Progress

Overview and Goals: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – adopted by all UN member states in 2015 – is a global blueprint with 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. It builds on the earlier Millennium Development Goals (2000–2015), aiming to “complete what these did not achieve”. The SDGs encompass a broad range of interconnected objectives across economic, social, and environmental dimensions, reflecting a holistic vision of development. Key goals include eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, expanding access to health, education, and clean water, reducing inequalities, promoting economic growth and decent work, fostering innovation and infrastructure, and protecting the planet’s ecosystems and climate. The agenda’s guiding principle is “leave no one behind,” emphasizing inclusion of the poorest and most vulnerable. The 17 goals are often grouped under five themes (the “5 Ps”): People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace, and Partnership. For example, People goals focus on ending poverty and ensuring dignity and equality; Planet goals seek to protect the environment and climate; Prosperity goals pursue inclusive economic growth; Peace goals promote just and inclusive societies; and Partnership underpins the means of implementation through global cooperation.

Progress Metrics and Monitoring: Each SDG has a set of measurable indicators to track progress. A Global Indicator Framework was developed to enable consistent monitoring across countries. Progress is reviewed regularly through mechanisms like the UN’s High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) and Voluntary National Reviews by individual countries. The UN Secretary-General issues annual SDG Progress Reports, and independent assessments (e.g. the SDSN’s Sustainable Development Report) also gauge progress using composite indices. The indicators cover a wide array of metrics – from rates of extreme poverty, child mortality and literacy, to carbon emissions and biodiversity loss – providing quantifiable benchmarks for each target. For instance, SDG 1 (No Poverty) tracks the percentage of people in extreme poverty, while SDG 13 (Climate Action) tracks greenhouse gas emissions and climate adaptation policies. These metrics enable the international community to identify where progress is on-track or lagging, and to hold stakeholders accountable.

Midway Status (2023): At the halfway point to 2030, progress is alarmingly off-track on many goals. According to the UN’s 2023 special SDG Progress Report, only about 12% of SDG targets are on track to be met by 2030. Progress on roughly half of all targets is weak or insufficient, and over 30% of targets have seen stagnation or reversal. Recent crises – the COVID-19 pandemic, economic shocks, rising conflicts, and climate disasters – have set back development gains. For example, the pandemic caused the first rise in extreme poverty in decades; indeed, as of 2023 more people live in extreme poverty than four years ago. Global hunger has reverted to mid-2000s levels, and at the current pace SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) will not be achieved. Alarmingly, gender equality (SDG 5) remains far off – one UN estimate suggests it could take 300 years to achieve full gender equality at the current rate. Economic inequalities have widened (just 26 billionaires own as much wealth as half of humanity), and the world is not on track to meet climate and environmental targets (carbon emissions are still rising, and biodiversity loss is accelerating). These sobering metrics prompted world leaders to call for a “rescue plan” for the SDGs at a mid-point summit in 2023, including measures to mobilize financing and re-energize implementation efforts.

Later Frameworks and Successor Agendas: Agenda 2030 runs through the year 2030, and discussions have begun on how to sustain global development efforts beyond that date. While no formal “Agenda 2040” or successor to the SDGs has been adopted yet, the UN is laying groundwork for the future. In 2021, UN Secretary-General António Guterres released a visionary report titled “Our Common Agenda,” which calls for renewing multilateral cooperation and sets out ideas to address emerging challenges beyond 2030. Notably, the UN General Assembly has agreed to convene a Summit of the Future in 2024 to consider reforms and new commitments for global governance, potentially including a “Pact for the Future”. These efforts indicate an intent to strengthen the global development framework post-2030, building on the SDGs with updated targets and tools. In parallel, major thematic agreements complement the 2030 Agenda: for example, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015), which commits countries to limiting global warming (and reaching net-zero emissions around mid-century), aligns with SDG 13 and extends climate action beyond 2030. Similarly, the new Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (2022) sets 2030 targets for conservation (like protecting 30% of land and oceans) and will feed into any post-2030 sustainability agenda. In summary, the SDGs remain the centerpiece of the global development agenda today, but the UN and its member states are already considering successor strategies to carry the momentum beyond 2030 – aiming to lock in gains and address gaps once the 2030 deadline arrives.

Strategic Agendas of the Top Global Powers: United States, China, and Russia

As of 2025, the world’s leading powers – the United States, China, and Russia – each pursue distinct strategic agendas on the international stage. Their objectives cover multiple domains: from geopolitical influence and world order, to economic and technological competition, to military security and global commons issues like climate change. Below is an analysis of each superpower’s current strategy in key areas, highlighting differences and overlaps in their global ambitions.

Geopolitical Influence and World Order

• United States: The U.S. seeks to uphold a liberal, rules-based international order that it helped establish after World War II. American strategy emphasizes alliances, democratic governance, and universal values as cornerstones of global stability. The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy portrays the world as entering a “decisive decade” of competition between governance models. It identifies rising authoritarian powers as prime challenges and explicitly states the U.S. will “outcompete” rivals to shape the international order. Washington’s goal is a “free, open, prosperous, and secure” world aligned with democratic ideals. To that end, the U.S. bolsters a network of alliances and partnerships across Europe and the Indo-Pacific – such as NATO, AUKUS, and the Quad – to amplify its influence. American officials describe this as strengthening the “rules-based order,” where international law and institutions constrain aggression. In practice, the U.S. positions itself as the leader of a broad coalition of like-minded nations. Recent strategy underscores strategic competition with China as the paramount test (“the only competitor with both the intent and capability to reshape the international order”) and the need to “constrain a dangerous Russia” following Moscow’s aggressive moves. Thus, U.S. geopolitical objectives center on containing authoritarian expansion, defending sovereignty (e.g. supporting Ukraine against Russia’s invasion), and rallying allies to address global challenges collectively. Washington also leverages soft power – promoting democracy, human rights, and development assistance – as part of its influence. In summary, the U.S. aims to maintain its leadership in a multipolar yet U.S.-led world order, preventing any rival from establishing hegemonic dominance in Europe or Asia.
• China: China’s grand strategy is oriented toward achieving great-power status and shaping a more multipolar world order conducive to its interests. Under President Xi Jinping, China has grown more assertive in foreign policy, articulating a vision of a “community with a shared future for mankind” and promoting what it calls “true multilateralism.” In essence, Beijing seeks greater influence in global governance and a rebalancing of power away from Western dominance. Official Chinese statements emphasize sovereign equality and non-interference, implicitly challenging U.S.-led alliances and sanctions. According to the report from the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress (2022), China has “taken a clear-cut stance against hegemonism and power politics in all their forms” and opposes unilateralism and “bullying” in international affairs. Instead, Beijing calls for a new type of international relations based on partnership rather than alliance blocs. In practical terms, China is expanding its geopolitical clout through economic statecraft and diplomatic initiatives. The flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – launched in 2013 – has seen China sign infrastructure and development cooperation agreements with over 150 countries across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Backed by nearly \$1 trillion in investments over a decade, the BRI enhances China’s influence as many nations become economically linked to Beijing. While China markets BRI as a win-win development program, analysts note it also serves to “extend China’s global influence” and project soft power. Beyond BRI, China has created or led new multilateral groupings (e.g. the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, BRICS cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) to increase its diplomatic weight. Strategically, Beijing aims to be recognized as a “major power” and seeks a voice in setting global norms on trade, technology, and security. It advocates for reforms in international institutions to give greater representation to developing countries (aligning with the Global South on many issues). China’s geopolitical ambition can be encapsulated in Xi’s call for “Asia for Asians” in regional security and a world order where no single country (i.e. the U.S.) dominates. By 2049 (the PRC’s centenary), China intends to be a global leader in composite national strength and international influence. Notably, Chinese and Russian worldviews converge on promoting multipolarity and opposing perceived Western hegemony, although China pursues these aims primarily through economic/diplomatic outreach rather than outright military confrontation. Overall, China’s strategic posture is one of a rising power asserting its interests and offering an alternative development model, while still officially espousing principles of peaceful coexistence.
• Russia: Russia’s international objectives focus on reasserting itself as a great power pole in a multipolar world and countering Western (especially U.S.) influence, which Moscow sees as encroaching on its security and stature. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has grown increasingly adversarial toward the West and seeks to revise aspects of the post-Cold War order that it views as unfavorable. The Kremlin’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept pointedly describes Russia as a “distinct civilization” and a “sovereign center of global development” that will defend its right to develop despite Western pressure. The document frames the United States and its allies as the principal source of instability, accusing Washington of pursuing global dominance at Russia’s expense. Accordingly, Moscow’s goal is to “eliminate the vestiges of dominance” by the U.S.-led West and foster a “just world order” reflecting Russia’s interests. In practical terms, Russia asserts influence over its immediate neighborhood – the post-Soviet space – and has acted militarily to prevent NATO/EU expansion there (as seen in Georgia in 2008, Ukraine from 2014 onward). Geopolitically, Putin’s Russia promotes the idea of a “Russian World” (Russkiy mir) uniting peoples of shared Russian culture or Orthodoxy, and claims a sphere of privileged interests around its borders. Beyond its region, Russia positions itself as a champion of global multipolarity, cultivating ties with major non-Western powers like China and India and with countries alienated by the West (Iran, Syria, Venezuela, etc.). It leverages arms exports, energy diplomacy, and sometimes disinformation or cyber tactics to extend influence, particularly in parts of Africa and the Middle East. Moscow has also deepened strategic alignment with Beijing; a notable joint statement in 2022 declared a “no limits” partnership, coordinating positions against Western pressure. Russian diplomacy often emphasizes state sovereignty and traditional values, criticizing Western promotion of liberal norms as meddling. The Kremlin now speaks of the West as openly hostile – for instance, describing the Ukraine conflict as a proxy war by NATO – and thus prioritizes “peaceful coexistence” with Western countries rather than integration. In essence, Russia’s global ambition is to be recognized as one of a handful of power centers shaping world affairs, with a veto on security matters in its vicinity and a strong voice internationally. This entails undermining U.S. influence where possible, strengthening alliances with China and the “Global South,” and asserting a conservative vision of world order that rejects Western liberal universalism. Notably, Russian and Chinese narratives both advocate multipolarity, but Russia (a declining economic power) often relies on hard power and risk-taking (e.g. military force) more overtly to stake its claims, as seen in Ukraine and in hybrid interference abroad.

Comparative Perspective: All three powers profess support for a stable international system, but their visions of world order differ fundamentally. The U.S. defends a status quo of alliances and institutions underwritten by American leadership, whereas China and Russia seek a transformed order where Western dominance is curtailed. Both Beijing and Moscow promote multipolarity – a concert of great powers – and emphasize state sovereignty over interventionist norms. However, China’s approach has been more economy-centric and gradual, while Russia’s has been more confrontational (including violating international law, as in the annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine). The U.S. and China are in an emergent superpower rivalry, especially in the Indo-Pacific, but notably they still cooperate within the UN framework and on certain global issues. Russia, having significantly weaker economic clout, often plays the role of a spoiler to Western initiatives and aligns with China for convenience, though it also strives for its own independent sphere. In summary, geopolitical influence is a paramount goal for all three – the U.S. to maintain primacy, China to attain primacy (at least in Asia, and eventually globally in some domains), and Russia to regain parity in decision-making – and this dynamic is a defining feature of international relations in the 2020s.

Economic Strategy and Global Trade

• United States: The U.S. economic strategy on the world stage combines promotion of an open global trading system with targeted measures to protect and enhance American economic strengths in the face of competition. In recent years, the U.S. has placed emphasis on industrial revitalization at home as a foundation for international influence – often termed a “foreign policy for the middle class.” Significant federal investments (e.g. the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022) aim to rebuild manufacturing capacity, secure supply chains for critical technologies, and reduce reliance on foreign (especially Chinese) imports. By “revitalizing domestic manufacturing” and R\&D, Washington seeks to “win the race for the 21st century” industries and ensure economic resilience. Globally, the U.S. champions fair trade and has shown skepticism toward China’s trade practices. While the U.S. has not rejoined broad agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, it has launched frameworks like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to set regional standards on trade, supply chains, and digital rules (though IPEF is not a traditional free trade deal). The U.S. also leverages its financial power: the dollar remains the world’s primary reserve currency, enabling the U.S. to impose impactful sanctions (as seen in the sweeping sanctions on Russia’s economy after the 2022 Ukraine invasion). Geoeconomically, the U.S. has responded to China’s BRI by mobilizing allies for alternative infrastructure financing. In 2022, President Biden and G7 partners unveiled the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) – a plan to mobilize \$600 billion by 2027 for infrastructure in developing countries. This initiative, explicitly framed as a “values-driven, high-standard” alternative to the BRI, aims to invest in projects (from rail corridors to renewable energy) that deepen ties between the G7 and the Global South. The underlying goal is to strengthen economic linkages with emerging economies so they are not “falling into China’s arms” exclusively. Additionally, U.S. trade strategy involves modernizing existing partnerships (e.g. the USMCA with Canada/Mexico replaced NAFTA) and enforcing trade rules (continuing some tariffs on China and pursuing WTO cases for unfair practices). Energy strategy has also become prominent: the U.S. has become a top oil and LNG producer, which it has used as leverage (boosting gas exports to Europe to replace Russian supplies). Overall, the U.S. economic agenda is defined by maintaining its central role in the global economy (through the dollar, U.S.-led institutions like the IMF/World Bank, and standard-setting) while selectively decoupling in areas critical to national security (like semiconductors and telecom equipment). Washington advocates for “secure and resilient” supply chains among allies (for example, shifting supply chains out of China for essentials) and has formed working groups like the Quad’s tech and vaccine initiatives for that purpose. In summary, American international economic policy balances openness and competition – promoting free markets and development finance, but also protecting strategic industries and countering rivals’ economic influence operations.
• China: China’s economic statecraft is central to its rise as a superpower. Beijing’s strategy intertwines domestic economic plans with global ambitions, aiming to make China the indispensable economic partner for much of the world. A cornerstone is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), through which China has financed ports, railways, roads, energy plants, and telecommunications in dozens of countries. This boosts China’s export of capital and construction expertise while securing access to resources and new markets. As noted, by 2023 China had 3,000+ BRI projects across 150+ countries, catalyzing nearly \$1 trillion in investment. Though some BRI projects have faced debt sustainability issues, the initiative overall expands China’s economic reach, establishing it as a key driver of infrastructure-led growth in the Global South. Complementing BRI, China has pursued trade leadership through regional agreements – it is a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (the world’s largest trade pact, in Asia-Pacific) and has sought to join the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive TPP), signaling interest in shaping trade rules. Domestically, China’s current strategy is encapsulated in the “Dual Circulation” policy: boosting domestic consumption and self-reliance (inner circulation) while still engaging global markets (outer circulation). This was born from pressures like U.S. trade sanctions – hence China’s push to indigenize critical supply chains (e.g. in semiconductors). Plans like “Made in China 2025” (an initiative to upgrade China’s manufacturing to high-tech, higher value sectors) and the 2035 industrial modernization goals underscore the intent to dominate industries such as EVs, 5G/6G telecommunications, advanced machinery, and biotech. Internationally, Chinese state banks and funds provide development loans that often secure long-term commodity supplies or strategic stakes (for instance, oil from Middle East/Africa, minerals from Latin America). China is also promoting use of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), in trade to chip away at the dollar’s dominance – arranging swap lines and encouraging oil and gas trade in RMB with partners like Russia and Gulf states. Since Western sanctions on Russia, RMB–ruble trade has surged, showcasing China’s role as an economic lifeline for sanctioned states. Furthermore, China spearheads new financing mechanisms such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (BRICS bank), reflecting a strategy to offer alternatives to Bretton Woods institutions. Beijing’s economic diplomacy tends to come with a non-interference branding (loans without governance conditionalities, unlike IMF), which appeals to some leaders. However, recipient countries have sometimes voiced concerns about debt burdens or undue influence. In sum, China’s global economic strategy is one of expansion and integration: using its financial clout, huge market, and manufacturing dominance to lock in trade relationships, infrastructure networks, and supply chain dependencies that collectively increase Chinese leverage in world affairs.
• Russia: Russia’s economic strategy is constrained by its relatively smaller and resource-dependent economy, but Moscow leverages the assets it does have – chiefly energy commodities, arms, and mineral resources – as tools of influence. A primary objective for Russia is to maintain its status as an “energy superpower.” Russia has long been one of the world’s top exporters of oil and natural gas, and it has used energy supply as a geopolitical instrument (e.g. cutting or increasing gas flows to Europe to gain political concessions). However, the landscape shifted dramatically after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Western sanctions targeted major Russian exports and financial institutions, prompting Russia to rapidly reorient its trade towards Asia. In 2022, China–Russia trade hit a record \$190 billion (a ~30% jump from 2021) as China became the top buyer of Russian oil and gas, largely offsetting lost European markets. Russia now sells oil to India and China at discounted rates, ensuring continued revenue while forging tighter ties with those giants. This pivot is part of Russia’s broader effort to “de-dollarize” and insulate its economy from Western pressure. Moscow is conducting more trade in rubles, yuan, and other non-dollar currencies, and increasing commerce with sanction-resilient partners (China, Turkey, Iran, etc.). Regionally, Russia leads the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a bloc with a common market (including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and others), aiming to harmonize trade in the former Soviet sphere. Though the EAEU’s economic weight is modest compared to the EU or China, it represents Russia’s attempt to integrate neighbors under its economic leadership and standard-setting (for instance, common tariffs, regulatory alignment). Another facet of Russia’s economic outreach is arms sales: Russia has for years been the second-largest arms exporter globally (after the U.S.), supplying weapons to Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America – which not only brings income but also cements military partnerships (e.g. with India, Vietnam, Algeria). Facing sanctions, Russia is now bargaining increased arms and energy deals with countries like Iran (drones for oil swaps) and Gulf states. Import substitution is a buzzword in Moscow’s policy – efforts to produce locally what it can no longer easily import, from food to microchips – but results have been mixed, with continued reliance on Chinese imports for high-tech goods. Domestically, a fall in imports due to sanctions actually led Russia to a record current-account surplus in 2022, but at the cost of technological regression. Looking forward, Russia’s economic ambition is to weather sanctions by building an alternative ecosystem: routing trade through “friendly” countries, embracing crypto and alternative payment systems, and capitalizing on its natural resources (it remains a major exporter of wheat, fertilizer, metals, and oil/gas). Climate transition poses a future challenge, as a global shift from fossil fuels would undercut Russia’s revenue model; however, Russia’s current strategy openly prioritizes maximizing fossil fuel exports in the near term (its Energy Strategy 2035 plans increased oil and gas output). In summary, Russia’s international economic strategy is one of adaptation and survival – using its commodity leverage to maintain influence, finding new markets to bypass Western isolation, and strengthening economic sovereignty where possible. Unlike the U.S. and China, Russia cannot offer vast investments or a huge consumer market; instead, it wields selective economic leverage (energy supply, strategic investments like nuclear power projects abroad, etc.) and seeks integration with non-Western economies to buttress its great-power status.

Comparative Perspective: The U.S. and China are the world’s two largest economies and are deeply intertwined, yet their strategic economic competition is intensifying. The U.S. model has typically favored open markets and liberal rules (with U.S. firms dominating many sectors), whereas China’s model leverages state-directed capitalism and bilateral deals (often favoring Chinese state-owned enterprises). The U.S. often coordinates economic actions with allies (for instance, the multilateral sanctions on Russia, or joint export controls on advanced tech to China), while China builds influence through unilateral financing and South–South cooperation. Russia, much smaller economically (its GDP is roughly 1/10th of the U.S. or China’s), plays a different game: it depends on niches (energy, arms) and has become more of a junior partner to China economically since 2022. All three powers are, in different ways, turning somewhat inward: the U.S. and China both talk of securing supply chains and technological self-reliance, and Russia has been forced to do so. This hints at a drift from hyper-globalization toward economic blocs or spheres of influence. One overlapping interest is infrastructure development: all three invest in connectivity projects (the U.S. via PGII, China via BRI, Russia via Eurasian corridors), which could complement each other in theory but more often serve as competing avenues of influence. Trade between the U.S. and China remains huge, but strategic distrust is leading to partial decoupling in sensitive sectors (e.g. semiconductors, 5G). Meanwhile, China and Russia’s trade relationship has grown asymmetrical (Russia provides raw materials, China provides manufactured goods and electronics) – symbolizing how China’s economic heft can dominate partners. In sum, economic strategy is both a field of rivalry – especially U.S. vs China in setting the norms and controlling key technologies – and a tool for power projection, with China’s BRI and U.S.-led sanctions being two stark examples of economics shaping geopolitics.

Technological Leadership and Innovation

• United States: Sustaining leadership in cutting-edge technologies is a strategic priority for the United States, viewed as vital to both economic prosperity and national security. American strategy highlights innovation as a core strength to be protected and advanced. The U.S. has long led in fields like aerospace, software, semiconductor design, biotech, and now artificial intelligence – owing largely to its robust R\&D ecosystem (major research universities, tech giants, and a tradition of government-supported science, especially through agencies like DARPA, NASA, NSF). In the current decade, the U.S. is doubling down on tech investment to fend off competitive challenges from China. The 2022 CHIPS and Science Act exemplifies this push, allocating \$52 billion for domestic semiconductor manufacturing and tens of billions more for science and emerging tech R\&D. Upon signing that Act, President Biden stated it would “ensure the United States remains the leader in industries of tomorrow” such as nanotech, quantum computing, and AI. Similarly, the U.S. is pioneering advances in AI (with American firms and labs at the forefront of AI research), quantum information science, hypersonic systems, and space exploration (e.g. NASA’s Artemis program to return to the Moon, involvement of private space companies). A notable element of U.S. strategy is protecting tech advantages from adversaries: recent export control measures have banned sales of the most advanced U.S. semiconductor chips and manufacturing equipment to China, aiming to prevent the Chinese military from acquiring cutting-edge capabilities. The U.S. is also tightening scrutiny of Chinese investments or acquisitions in sensitive sectors (through mechanisms like CFIUS) and rallying allies (Japan, Netherlands, etc.) to implement similar export curbs on technologies like lithography machines. In defense, the Pentagon’s concept of maintaining a “technological offset” means integrating emerging tech – AI for autonomous systems, cyber capabilities, biotechnologies – to retain military superiority. U.S. policy documents frame tech leadership as a values issue too: ensuring technologies like the internet, 5G, AI are developed and used in line with democratic principles (privacy, openness) rather than authoritarian models. This has led to initiatives like the “Global Partnership on AI” among democracies and discussions about a Techno-Democratic Alliance. In education and talent, the U.S. still attracts many of the world’s best scientists (though visa hurdles and competition from China’s talent programs are concerns). Summarily, the U.S. approach is to innovate faster than rivals and deny them critical tech where possible – effectively a strategy of running ahead while slowing others. Washington views the contest for tech dominance, especially with China, as a defining feature of great-power competition in the 21st century.
• China: Achieving supremacy in advanced technology is a pillar of China’s national strategy, intertwined with its economic and security ambitions. Chinese leaders often speak of the current era as one of transformative technological revolution – and they are determined not to be left behind or dependent on foreigners. Over the past decade, China has made massive investments in R\&D, now second only to the U.S. in total R\&D spending. Government directives like the “Next Generation AI Development Plan” outline clear goals (e.g. making China the world’s primary AI innovation center by 2030). Similarly, China’s Five-Year Plans and the Made in China 2025 roadmap target dominance in sectors such as robotics, aerospace, renewable energy, electric vehicles, pharmaceuticals, and high-tech manufacturing. To achieve this, China employs a model of state-driven innovation: funding research institutes, incentivizing companies (both state-owned and private) through subsidies and procurement, and sometimes acquiring foreign tech through partnerships or outright acquisition. The results are increasingly evident – Chinese companies lead globally in 5G telecommunications (Huawei), high-speed rail, solar panel and battery production, and are making swift progress in semiconductors (despite sanctions) and commercial aviation (with the COMAC C919 jet entering service). Indigenous innovation has become a mantra, especially after the U.S. began restricting tech transfers. The Chinese government has launched “whole-nation” mega-projects to crack bottleneck technologies (for instance, achieving a domestic 7nm chip production or developing its own GPS alternative, Beidou). According to the CPC’s 20th Congress report, China will “mobilize resources nationwide to make key technological breakthroughs” in strategic fields, and “achieve breakthroughs in core technologies in key fields” to rid itself of reliance on foreign tech. One notable strength is China’s scale – it graduates large numbers of STEM students and its tech industry can rapidly implement at scale (for example, rolling out digital payment, high-speed trains, or big data applications to hundreds of millions of users). However, China still lags in certain cutting-edge areas (e.g. semiconductor equipment, some aspects of aerospace). To address this, it has engaged in aggressive tactics like technology transfer requirements for foreign companies, and, Western intelligence alleges, cyber-espionage to steal intellectual property. Internationally, China is trying to set tech standards: e.g. pushing its standards for 5G, AI ethics, and e-commerce in international bodies, and using forums (Digital Silk Road as part of BRI) to export Chinese tech infrastructure. Moreover, tech is a key arena of U.S.-China rivalry: China has responded to U.S. export bans with its own unreliable entities list and export controls (for instance, on rare earth minerals crucial to electronics). Chinese tech firms like TikTok and Huawei have faced restrictions in the West over data security concerns, a sign of how technology and geopolitics are now deeply interlinked. In essence, China’s vision is to become a global technological superpower by mid-century, leading in innovation and setting the rules – a dramatic shift from decades past when China was mainly a low-end manufacturer. This ambition is underwritten by nationalism as well; Xi Jinping often links the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation with mastering science and technology.
• Russia: Russia’s position in the technology domain is comparatively weaker and more narrowly focused. During the Soviet era, Russia was a science powerhouse (excelling in space, mathematics, military tech), but post-Cold War economic troubles caused a lag in civilian high-tech industries. Today, Russia’s tech strategy concentrates on a few areas where it seeks to maintain strength, particularly military and aerospace technology, while trying to reduce dependence on Western tech for its civilian economy. In the military sphere, Russia has invested in modernizing its strategic weapons – it has deployed new generations of nuclear delivery systems, such as the “Avangard” hypersonic glide vehicle and the “Sarmat” ICBM, as well as hypersonic missiles like Kinzhal, aiming to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. It has also developed advanced air defense systems (e.g. S-400, S-500) which it exports. In electronic warfare and certain aerospace segments (rocket engines, some satellite tech), Russia remains competent. However, Western sanctions have cut off Russia from many dual-use technologies (microelectronics, precision tools), threatening to erode even its military edge over time. Outside defense, Russia has pockets of excellence – nuclear energy technology (Rosatom is a leading builder of nuclear reactors worldwide), cryptography and some IT (Kaspersky in cybersecurity), and a burgeoning fintech scene (domestic alternatives for payment systems after Visa/Mastercard pullout). The government has articulated goals for “digital sovereignty,” attempting to foster Russian-made software and internet infrastructure. For example, there are efforts to develop domestic CPUs (Elbrus processors) and promote Russian Linux-based operating systems in government and industry, to avoid reliance on U.S. tech companies. In practice, however, Russia’s tech sector relies heavily on imports, especially from China since 2022 (Chinese electronics now fill the gap for consumer devices and industrial components). Brain drain is a concern too: many skilled Russian tech workers emigrated amid political crackdown and war. One notable initiative is Russia’s focus on space and aerospace: it was a key partner in the International Space Station and is now pivoting to collaborate more with China on space exploration (planning a joint lunar base, for instance). Additionally, Russia has strengths in basic science (mathematics, physics) and has voiced interest in AI and quantum computing – Putin famously said in 2017 that “whoever leads in AI will rule the world” – but concrete achievements in these areas trail the U.S. and China. Cyber capabilities are another facet: Russia is considered a top-tier cyber power, though often discussed in terms of espionage or sabotage (hacking, influence campaigns) rather than innovation. In summary, Russia’s technological strategy is defensive in many respects – trying to avoid falling irreversibly behind by securing certain niches and substituting foreign tech – and opportunistic, leveraging its existing expertise (nuclear tech, heavy industry, military R\&D) to remain relevant. Unlike the U.S. and China, Russia cannot comprehensively compete across all cutting-edge fields due to limited resources and sanctions isolation, so it picks battles where it must (e.g. electronic warfare, encryption) or where it can claim leadership (hypersonic missiles, nuclear reactors).

Comparative Perspective: The U.S. retains a broad lead in many technological domains but faces an unprecedented challenger in China, which is rapidly narrowing the gap in several fields. The competition is especially intense in AI, semiconductor tech, 5G/6G, quantum computing, and green tech (like EVs and batteries). The U.S. approach relies on its dynamic private sector and alliances (for instance, the U.S. working with European, Japanese, and Korean firms on chip supply chains), whereas China’s approach leverages centralized planning and sheer scale (with massive data and a protected domestic market to nurture its tech firms). Russia, by contrast, is mostly a bystander in the U.S.-China tech race except in military-specific tech. One overlap is that all three recognize tech leadership as essential to national power. All invest in R\&D (China’s R\&D spending as a percentage of GDP has been rising quickly, the U.S. is boosting government science funding again, and Russia tries to sustain spending on key labs even during sanctions). However, there is a techno-ideological divide: the U.S. and its allies worry about Chinese and Russian use of tech for authoritarian control (e.g. surveillance AI, censorship systems), while China and Russia push back against what they see as U.S. “technological hegemony.” This has led to fragmentation of technology ecosystems – for example, a bifurcation of internet governance (open internet vs. sovereign-controlled internet), and separate navigation satellite networks, payment systems, etc. In summary, in the realm of technology and innovation, the U.S. and China are the main competitors, racing to innovate and set standards for the 21st century, while Russia plays a more limited role, emphasizing tech for strategic deterrence and trying to avoid technological dependency.

Security and Military Policy

• United States: The U.S. retains the most powerful military in the world and its security strategy revolves around deterring major state adversaries, reassuring allies, and addressing transnational threats. As outlined in recent defense strategy documents, the U.S. views the People’s Republic of China as the “pacing challenge” – the most comprehensive, long-term competitor – and Russia as an acute threat in the near term. U.S. military policy is thus focused on preventing Chinese or Russian aggression that could undermine the U.S.-led order. In Europe, that means reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank to contain Russia (especially after its invasion of Ukraine). In Asia, it means bolstering U.S. forces and partnerships to deter a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan or coercion in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The U.S. maintains a global network of around 750 overseas military bases or installations, underpinning its ability to project power to virtually any region. Key alliances – NATO, bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and others – are considered “force multipliers” for U.S. security interests. The U.S. Navy (with 11 nuclear-powered carrier strike groups) and Air Force give the U.S. unmatched power projection and air dominance capabilities. Current American defense strategy emphasizes modernization: investing in next-gen capabilities like hypersonic weapons (to keep pace with Chinese and Russian developments), advanced cyber and space defense (as rivals weaponize those domains), and modernizing the nuclear triad (bombers, ICBMs, submarines) to maintain credible deterrence. The U.S. also pursues an integrated approach – termed “integrated deterrence” in the 2022 National Defense Strategy – which means combining military might with economic, technological, and diplomatic tools to dissuade adversaries. Counterterrorism, which dominated U.S. security policy after 9/11, has receded as a central focus after the end of the Afghanistan War in 2021; however, the U.S. maintains capabilities (special forces, drones) to strike terrorist groups as needed. Additionally, the U.S. frames collective security as extending to non-traditional threats: it identifies pandemics, climate change, and cyberattacks as security issues that require international cooperation. On the military posture front, the U.S. is strengthening Indo-Pacific deployments (e.g. rotating more naval assets to the Pacific, building new partnerships like AUKUS which will provide Australia with nuclear submarine technology) to counter China’s growing navy. In Europe, since 2022 the U.S. has increased troop presence and prepositioned equipment to deter further Russian moves beyond Ukraine. Diplomacy and arms control: The U.S. has signaled willingness to extend arms control measures (like New START) but those efforts are faltering as Russia has suspended participation, and China’s nuclear arsenal grows without any treaty constraints. Ultimately, U.S. security strategy is about maintaining a favorable balance of power in key regions and defending the global commons (sea lanes, airspace, space, cyberspace) – essentially preserving freedom of navigation and commerce against challenges. Washington often cites its commitment to “peace through strength,” meaning a strong military is seen as the best guarantor that large-scale war (e.g. in the Taiwan Strait or Baltic region) will never be launched by adversaries.
• China: China’s security and military strategy is driven by its desire to protect core national interests, especially territorial integrity, and to assert its stature in the region and beyond. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone a rapid modernization and expansion program under Xi Jinping. China’s defense priorities start with “Taiwan reunification” – the PLA’s primary contingency planning is deterring Taiwanese independence and, if ordered, forcibly unifying Taiwan with the mainland. This has led China to develop a robust “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) umbrella in the Western Pacific: hundreds of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles (like the DF-21D “carrier-killer”) that can threaten U.S. carrier groups and bases in the region, a large modernizing navy (now the world’s largest by number of ships) with growing blue-water capabilities, and advanced air defenses and fighter aircraft. The Chinese military budget has seen decades of double-digit growth (though still less than a third of U.S. spending). Xi set two key milestones: for the PLA to “basically complete modernization by 2035” and to become a “world-class military” by 2049. That implies parity with, or superiority over, the U.S. in key areas by mid-century. In Asia, China’s security strategy is increasingly assertive: it has militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea, asserting expansive maritime claims despite an international tribunal ruling against those claims. It also presses its territorial claims along the Indian border and in the East China Sea (the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute with Japan), using a combination of military presence and grey-zone tactics (coast guard and maritime militia). Chinese strategic documents still espouse a defensive posture, using terms like “active defense,” and note that China has a no-first-use nuclear policy and far fewer nuclear warheads (~400) than the U.S. or Russia. However, Western intelligence indicates China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal (possibly aiming for 1000+ warheads by 2030), seeking a more robust deterrent. Regionally, China’s concept of security includes pushing the U.S. military farther out from its coasts (hence the A2/AD focus) and diminishing U.S. alliance influence. To that end, China offers its own security initiatives: in 2022, Xi proposed a Global Security Initiative (GSI), a vague framework calling for “indivisible security” (a term echoing Russian phrasing) and respect for sovereignty, implicitly criticizing U.S. alliances and sanctions. On the world stage, China has become more involved in UN peacekeeping and has a base in Djibouti, signaling a willingness to protect its overseas interests (like BRI investments, citizens abroad) with force if needed. Technology is a big element: China is racing to lead in military AI, quantum communication (it launched the world’s first quantum satellite), and space (including anti-satellite weapons tested in 2007 and since). In summary, China’s military strategy is about securing its periphery – making it risky for others to interfere in China’s claims or vicinity – and gradually extending its operational reach. While China currently has regional military dominance aspirations (in East/South Asia), by 2049 it envisions a military capable of protecting Chinese interests globally, commensurate with its economic power. Unlike the U.S., China lacks a formal alliance network (aside from a treaty with North Korea and partnerships like with Pakistan), but it deepens defense ties via arms sales and exercises (e.g. joint drills with Russia, naval port calls with countries in the Indian Ocean). Ultimately, China’s security policy balances a declared preference for peaceful development with a clear-eyed preparation for potential conflict, particularly over Taiwan or maritime disputes, if it deems its sovereignty and development space threatened.
• Russia: Russia’s security strategy is assertive and risk-tolerant, aimed at both defending against what it perceives as NATO encirclement and projecting power to reclaim influence lost after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Nuclear force is the bedrock of Russia’s security – it possesses the largest nuclear arsenal (alongside the U.S.) and frequently brandishes its nuclear capability as a strategic deterrent to NATO. Russian doctrine, updated in recent years, reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if the existence of the state is threatened, and ambiguities in doctrine are sometimes interpreted as leaving room for limited nuclear use to “de-escalate” a large conventional conflict on Russia’s terms. In the conventional domain, Russia undertook extensive military reforms and modernization in the 2008–2020 period, professionalizing parts of its army and introducing new equipment (like the Su-35 fighter, Armata tank, advanced submarines). These forces have been actively used: Russia demonstrated expeditionary capability by intervening in Syria (2015) to shore up the Assad regime, and it maintains military bases across the former USSR (e.g. in Armenia, Tajikistan) and even Africa (a base in Sudan is under discussion). However, the biggest test – the war against Ukraine (launched in Feb 2022) – has severely strained Russia’s military, revealing logistical and command weaknesses and resulting in massive casualties and equipment losses under stiff Ukrainian resistance backed by Western arms. This war has now become the primary focus of Russian security policy: Moscow frames it as an existential fight against NATO expansion and has poured a large portion of its forces into Ukraine. The conflict has also led Russia to increase defense production (artillery, missiles, etc.) and seek arms from partners like Iran (drones). Even as it’s bogged down in Ukraine, Russia continues to signal resolve in other areas: it routinely conducts military exercises in the Arctic (as it seeks to dominate the opening Northern Sea Route) and intercepts NATO aircraft over the Black Sea. Asymmetric tactics are a notable part of Russia’s playbook. This includes cyber warfare (such as the 2017 NotPetya attack, or ongoing cyber operations against Ukraine’s grid), disinformation campaigns targeting elections and social stability in Western countries, and use of private military companies like Wagner Group to exert influence in conflict zones (from Donbas to Syria to several African states) while maintaining plausible deniability. Russia also leans on its intelligence services for covert action. In terms of alliances, Russia has a formal mutual defense pact only with a few post-Soviet states via the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but even that is shaky (seen when CSTO ally Kazakhstan kept neutral on Ukraine and Armenia criticized CSTO in 2022). Instead, Russia has cultivated a loose anti-Western alignment: notably its strategic partnership with China (not a formal alliance, but militarily significant joint exercises and coordination), and military cooperation with Iran (drones for Russia, promise of fighter jets for Iran). On defense industry, Russia heavily exports weapons, which also creates partnerships (India, for example, long relied on Russian arms and collaborates on projects like BrahMos missiles). In summary, Russia’s security strategy is one of forward defense and coercion – forward defense in that it pushes conflicts outward (preferring to fight in neighboring territories like Ukraine or Georgia rather than allow NATO to get closer), and coercion in that it often uses or threatens force to achieve its aims (be it energy cutoff threats or troop buildups). The brutal application of force in Ukraine and rhetorical nuclear threats have set Russia at odds with the Western security order, possibly for years to come. Russia sees itself as the guarantor of security for the “Russian world” and as a balancer against U.S. power, willing to take high-stakes actions to maintain what it considers its rightful sphere of influence.

Comparative Perspective: The security doctrines of the three powers reflect their geopolitical positions: the United States, as a status-quo superpower, focuses on global power projection and alliance-based collective security; China, as a rising power, is building up to potentially displace U.S. primacy at least regionally and is increasingly assertive but still avoids direct military conflict; Russia, as a resurgent but constrained power, relies on hard power gambits and nuclear saber-rattling to punch above its economic weight. All three are nuclear powers and permanent UN Security Council members, which puts some theoretical checks on direct confrontation among them (the risk of nuclear war remains a deterrent). However, tensions are high: NATO and Russia are effectively in a proxy war in Ukraine, and the U.S. and China are engaged in an intense military rivalry in Asia (with close encounters in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea). On the other hand, there are areas of shared interest: for example, counterterrorism saw occasional U.S.-China-Russia cooperation (all three feared ISIS and similar groups). And all three have at times worked in concert at the UN on issues like anti-piracy patrols or peacekeeping. A key difference is in alliances: the U.S. has formal defense commitments to many nations, amplifying its security reach, whereas China and Russia prefer flexible partnerships (both often tout that their alignment is not a formal alliance, perhaps to avoid entanglement). In military technology, the U.S. currently leads (stealth bombers, force multipliers like aerial refueling, etc.), but China is rapidly catching up in quantity and certain quality (like shipbuilding, missiles), while Russia has shown some niche advancements but largely lags in C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities evident in its Ukraine performance. Each power also has budgetary constraints: U.S. defense spending (~\$800B annually) far outstrips China’s (estimated \$250B+) and Russia’s (perhaps \$65B pre-war, though now a larger share of a shrinking GDP), enabling sustained global operations that China and Russia can’t yet match. In conclusion, military policy is where the sharpest distinctions and potential clashes lie: U.S. guarantees underpin the security of many regions, China is challenging that framework especially in Asia, and Russia has upended peace in Europe to claw back influence – the interplay of these strategies will shape whether the world moves toward greater conflict or manages a stable balance.

Climate and Sustainability Commitments

• United States: After a period of retrenchment, the United States has reasserted itself in recent years as a leader on climate change – though domestic politics continue to influence the level of ambition. Under the Biden Administration, the U.S. rejoined the Paris Agreement in 2021 (reversing the prior withdrawal) and set an aggressive target to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 50–52% below 2005 levels by 2030. This nationally determined contribution (NDC) aligns with a longer-term goal of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. To pursue these targets, the U.S. implemented major climate legislation: the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 included roughly \$369 billion for clean energy and climate-related investments – the largest climate investment in U.S. history. The IRA and related laws provide incentives for renewable energy expansion, electric vehicle adoption (tax credits to target 50% of new car sales being EVs by 2030), domestic manufacturing of clean tech (like solar panels, batteries), and methane emission reductions from oil/gas operations. Collectively, these policies put the U.S. “within reach” of its 2030 goal according to analyses. Beyond mitigation, U.S. climate strategy emphasizes resilience and adaptation (given more frequent wildfires, hurricanes, etc. at home) and environmental justice (ensuring disadvantaged communities benefit from green investments). Internationally, the U.S. has sought to reclaim a leadership mantle by convening forums (e.g. Biden’s Leaders Summit on Climate in April 2021) and prodding other major emitters to enhance ambition. It has pledged climate finance for developing countries – \$11.4 billion per year by 2024 – though actual appropriations have lagged (a point of criticism). The U.S. also joined global pacts like the Global Methane Pledge to cut methane 30% by 2030. On multilateral climate diplomacy, the U.S. and China restarted bilateral climate talks in late 2023 (after a pause due to political tensions) since their cooperation is deemed crucial. The U.S. military and security community routinely acknowledges climate change as a “threat multiplier” that can exacerbate conflicts, and U.S. strategies integrate climate into national security planning. One area of divergence is that the U.S. has not fully embraced certain global mechanisms like carbon pricing or treaties to phase out fossil fuels – instead focusing on innovation and incentives. Also, domestic opposition remains among some politicians who argue climate policies could hurt the economy, leading to the pushback against regulations. Nonetheless, with current policies, the U.S. is positioning itself as a competitor in the clean energy economy (e.g. attempting to out-compete China’s dominance in solar and batteries by reshoring production) while also trying to meet its responsibility as the largest historical emitter. The credibility of U.S. commitments does face scrutiny due to its flip-flop (Paris, then withdrawal, then rejoin) – but as of 2025, the U.S. is firmly back in the camp of nations treating climate change as an urgent priority, encapsulated by Biden’s statement that the climate crisis is an “existential threat.”
• China: China plays a dual role in climate change: it is the world’s largest carbon emitter in current annual terms (around 30% of global CO₂), but also the largest investor in renewable energy and a key driver of cost reductions for clean technology. Beijing’s climate commitments have evolved significantly. In 2020, President Xi Jinping announced at the UN that China will aim to peak its carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. This marked the first time China set a net-zero goal and was hailed as a major boost to global efforts. To reach peak emissions, China has pledged to steadily reduce its carbon intensity (emissions per unit GDP) and increase non-fossil energy to 25% of its energy mix by 2030. In its updated NDC, China committed to reach around 1.2 billion kW of total wind and solar capacity by 2030, a massive scale (for context, that’s more than double the world’s total wind/solar capacity in 2020). China is on track or ahead on some fronts – its renewable installation is world-leading (over 300 GW solar and 400 GW wind already by 2023), and it’s rolling out electric vehicles faster than any nation (EVs were ~25% of new cars in China in 2022). It also launched a national emissions cap-and-trade system (ETS) in 2021, albeit initially covering only the power sector with modest price signals. However, China also faces contradictions: it remains heavily reliant on coal (over half of its energy). In fact, energy security and economic growth concerns have led China to approve new coal-fired power plants in recent years, even as it also leads in solar and wind – a seeming paradox often summarized as China being the biggest polluter and biggest producer of green solutions simultaneously. Chinese officials justify that as aligning with the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” – i.e. as a developing country (with lower historical emissions per capita than the West), China will transition on its own timeline. They stress that China’s per capita emissions are around the EU’s level and far below the U.S., and that developed nations should provide financing and technology to help developing ones. Internationally, China has positioned itself as a supporter of the Paris Agreement (filling the void during the Trump years) and has ramped up diplomacy through the BASIC coalition (with Brazil, South Africa, India) to represent developing world interests in climate talks. In 2021, Xi also announced China will stop building new coal power projects abroad (important since it was a major coal plant financier via BRI). China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) has strong climate components, including targets for energy efficiency and a continued shift to low-carbon sources. Local air pollution concerns also drive China to cut coal use near cities. As 2060 draws closer, observers note China will need to accelerate the retirement of coal and deployment of carbon capture or nuclear to reach neutrality – a herculean task given its size. Still, China’s climate stance has moved from reluctant participant two decades ago to proactive player now setting the pace in renewables. Its narrative emphasizes balancing development with environment – slogans like “ecological civilization” and building a “Beautiful China” by mid-century align with SDG-like sustainability ideals. In sum, China is committed to climate action on its terms: it wants to be seen as a responsible major power fighting climate change, but it also insists on energy sovereignty and a gradual transition (peaking no later than 2030, neutrality by 2060) rather than abrupt cuts that could imperil economic growth.
• Russia: Russia’s approach to climate and sustainability is often characterized as ambivalent or lagging. As a petro-state with an economy heavily dependent on oil and gas exports, Russia has historically been reluctant to pursue aggressive emission cuts. It did join the Paris Agreement (formally ratifying it in 2019) and has set official targets, but these are notably unambitious. Russia’s current 2030 target (NDC) is to reduce emissions by 30% below 1990 levels. Due to the collapse of the Soviet industrial base in the 1990s, Russia’s emissions in 1990 were extremely high; by 2000 they had fallen roughly 40%. That means Russia can technically increase emissions from today and still meet its 2030 goal – indeed, it’s a target the government can “easily reach… with adopted policies,” reflecting “minimal action”. In late 2021, President Putin did announce a goal of carbon neutrality by 2060, aligning with China’s timeline, which was somewhat surprising given earlier skepticism. However, Russia has provided few details on how to get there, apart from heavily counting its vast forests as carbon sinks. Russian climate policy often points to its forests absorbing emissions and its nuclear power/hydropower as already low-carbon elements of its energy mix. In practice, Moscow’s energy strategy prioritizes expanding fossil fuel extraction – including developing the Arctic for oil and gas and increasing coal exports to Asia – which runs counter to global decarbonization trends. The war in Ukraine and resulting sanctions have further complicated matters: European buyers pivoting away from Russian gas accelerated Russia’s turn to Asian markets, but also the long-term demand from a decarbonizing EU is diminishing. Domestically, Russia is already experiencing climate impacts (melting permafrost, Siberian heatwaves, and massive wildfires), but the government’s rhetoric sometimes downplays the urgency. Putin once quipped about Russians saving on fur coats with warming, though he later acknowledged climate change’s dangers. Adaptation has not been a high priority publicly, and mitigation steps are modest – for instance, some energy efficiency programs and a fledgling renewable sector (Russia has huge renewable potential but currently derives only a few percent of electricity from wind/solar). Russia also has significant forest resources, and it has joined global efforts to curb deforestation. Yet illegal logging and management issues persist. In international negotiations, Russia often aligns with fossil-fuel exporters (it objected to strong language on phasing out oil/gas at COP27, for example). On the positive side, Russia has world-class scientists who contribute to climate research, and there’s growing awareness among its younger population and private sector (some companies eye hydrogen exports or offset projects). Additionally, pre-war, Russia was exploring a carbon pricing pilot in Sakhalin region aiming for carbon neutrality there. However, the isolation due to war may stall whatever momentum was developing. Importantly, Russia’s vast oil and gas exports mean what it does affects the global carbon budget: if Russia were to diversify and decarbonize, it could accelerate the world’s transition; if it instead doubles down on extracting every barrel it can while there’s still demand (as seems the case), it remains a drag on global efforts. In summary, Russia’s climate commitment on paper (30% by 2030, net-zero 2060) exists but lacks ambition and credibility. The country’s current trajectory is insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement’s goals, and climate is often subordinate to Russia’s near-term strategic and economic calculations.

Comparative Perspective: Climate policy is one domain where the interests of the U.S., China, and Russia diverge in terms of effort, yet converge in that all are needed for a solution. The United States (after rejoining Paris) and China (with its 2060 pledge) have formed a tacit understanding – as the two biggest emitters – to lead, or at least not obstruct, global climate action. They have a mix of rivalry and cooperation: they compete in industries like solar panels and EVs, but also have engaged in joint initiatives (e.g. the U.S.-China Glasgow Declaration 2021 to cooperate on cutting emissions this decade). Russia, by contrast, often plays the role of laggard, with minimal commitments and even potential to undermine action (for instance, by increasing fossil fuel exports to Asia as others cut back). On numerical targets: U.S. aiming for ~51% cut by 2030 (from 2005) and net-zero 2050, China aiming to peak by 2030 and net-zero 2060, and Russia effectively allowing itself to increase emissions to 2030 and only talk of net-zero by 2060. A key overlap is that all three recognize the reality of climate change to some extent – even Russia, which used to be more openly skeptical, now at least formally acknowledges it. All have signed the Paris Agreement, so none is outside the global framework. However, the level of policy implementation varies greatly. The U.S. and China are deploying significant resources toward clean energy (leading the world in renewable investments), whereas Russia invests relatively little in renewables. Another point of contention is climate finance: developing countries demand more funding from rich nations (including the U.S.) and contributions from big emitters like China and Russia. The U.S. has pledged funds (though not always delivered in full), China positions itself as still a developing nation but does fund south-south green projects, and Russia’s contributions are negligible. Geopolitically, climate change is also creating new theaters: the Arctic is opening up due to melting ice, and all three are eyeing the region (Russia has the largest Arctic border and is militarizing it; the U.S. and China also have strategic interests there – China calls itself a “near-Arctic state”). Lastly, domestic public opinion influences their stances: U.S. public opinion is divided but increasingly favorable to climate action; Chinese public generally supports environmental cleanup given pollution issues; Russian public is less openly vocal on climate, with other concerns more pressing. In conclusion, climate and sustainability is an area of both cooperation and competition. The U.S. and China have stepped up actions and, if they collaborate, can significantly push global progress, whereas Russia currently stands as the least aligned with the ambitious climate trajectory envisioned in the Paris Agreement. The differences in their climate commitments highlight broader contrasts in how each power balances short-term economic interests with the long-term planetary imperative.

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Comparative Summary of Global Ambitions

The following table synthesizes the strategic agendas of the United States, China, and Russia across key dimensions, illustrating points of contrast and convergence in their international objectives:

Aspect

United States (🇺🇸)

China (🇨🇳)

Russia (🇷🇺)

Vision of World Order

Supports a U.S.-led “rules-based international order” rooted in alliances, democracy, and liberal norms. Aims to maintain primacy and contain authoritarian “revisionist” powers.

Advocates a multipolar world with greater role for emerging powers. Promotes “community of shared future” rhetoric, emphasizing sovereignty and opposing U.S. hegemony. Seeks to reform global governance to be more China-centric over time.

Champions multipolarity and a “distinct civilization” status for itself. Seeks to undo Western dominance (“vestiges of Washington’s dominance”). Emphasizes state sovereignty and often flouts liberal norms – willing to use force to revise the regional order (e.g. in Eurasia).

Geopolitical Influence

Global alliance network (NATO, Indo-Pacific partners) as force multiplier. Projects power worldwide (troops in Europe, Asia, Middle East). Uses diplomacy and aid to promote democracy/human rights. Postures as guarantor of international security public goods (sea lanes, non-proliferation).

Economic diplomacy as primary tool (BRI spanning 150+ countries). Expanding influence especially in Global South via trade, infrastructure, and institutions (AIIB, SCO, BRICS). Avoids formal alliances; instead builds partnerships and seeks regional primacy in Asia (e.g. South China Sea control).

Regional dominance in former Soviet sphere is priority (views NATO/EU expansion as threat). Uses energy leverage, military intervention (Ukraine, Syria), and hybrid tactics (cyber, info-war) to assert influence. Aligns with China and courted partners in Asia/Africa to build an anti-Western coalition, but has fewer economic means to sustain global influence.

Economic Strategy

Reinvest at home to compete abroad – e.g. huge domestic bills (CHIPS Act, IRA) to spur manufacturing and tech. Pursues free but fair trade: supports open markets, yet confronts China’s trade practices (tariffs, export controls). Leverages dollar dominance and sanctions for strategic ends (e.g. isolating Russia). Initiated PGII (\$600 bn) to counter BRI. Focus on secure supply chains with allies (reshoring critical industries, “friend-shoring”).

Export-led growth shifting to dual circulation – still global trade powerhouse but boosting domestic consumption/self-reliance. Leads mega trade/investment initiatives (BRI over \$1 trillion invested, RCEP in Asia). Techno-economic self-sufficiency drive (Made in China 2025, semiconductor independence) to mitigate U.S. decoupling. Promotes RMB internationalization gradually. Often provides no-strings loans to developing states, expanding yuan trade especially with sanctioned countries (e.g. buying Russian energy in RMB).

Commodity-centric – relies on oil, gas, arms exports. Economic pivot to Asia due to Western sanctions: record trade with China (₽1.28 trn or \$190 bn in 2022) and growing energy supply to India, Turkey, etc. Pushes Eurasian integration (EAEU) but those economies are small. Emphasizes “fortress economy” tactics: ruble transactions, gold reserves, import substitution (e.g. domestic IT) to withstand sanctions. Limited diversification; economy under strain, effectively a junior partner in China-led economic sphere now.

Technological Ambition

Aims to maintain global lead in critical technologies. Massive R\&D funding for AI, quantum, biotech, space. Protecting tech advantage is key – strict export bans to adversaries (e.g. chips to China). Strength in software, semiconductor design, aerospace, pharma; leveraging private sector innovation (Big Tech, startups) + government incentives. Building coalitions (e.g. Chip 4 alliance with Taiwan, Japan, ROK) to stay ahead of China. Concerned with standard-setting in tech (promotes open internet vs. authoritarian surveillance models).

Determined to catch up and surpass in high-tech fields. State-driven innovation: huge investments and national programs to achieve breakthroughs in “core technologies” (semiconductors, AI, EVs, green tech, aerospace). Leading in 5G (Huawei), fintech, and scalable manufacturing (drones, solar panels, etc.). By 2030s, wants to be peer competitor in AI and advanced manufacturing. Has launched tech standard initiatives (e.g. China Standards 2035) to shape global norms. Still imports certain cutting-edge chips and tools; working aggressively to eliminate these chokepoints.

Focused on military and strategic tech to ensure security independence. Excels in areas like nuclear technology (reactors, icebreakers), certain defense systems (hypersonic missiles, air defenses). Limited civilian tech innovation – relies on Western/Chinese imports for electronics, machinery. Push for digital sovereignty (Russian-made software, controlled internet) partly for regime control and sanctions evasion. Not a major player in global tech standard-setting; often adapts or copies foreign tech. Brain drain and sanctions impede its tech sector growth, forcing reliance on older or foreign technology in many fields.

Security & Military

“Peace through strength” posture. Global force projection with unmatched navy and air force; formal defense pacts in Europe (NATO) and Asia (Japan, S.Korea, etc.). Nuclear triad modernized to deter peer wars. Priority to deter China and Russia aggression – forward-deployed troops in Europe (Baltics, Poland) and Asia-Pacific (Guam, Japan). Promotes freedom of navigation (South China Sea, Persian Gulf) via naval patrols. Counter-terrorism and Middle East engagement still active but reduced post-Afghanistan. Seeks arms control but faces breakdown (INF treaty gone, New START suspended by Russia). Integrates new domains: cybersecurity and space seen as critical (established Space Force). Military budget ~\$800B/year enables robust R\&D and global readiness.

Regional defense orientation expanding global reach. PLA prioritizes preventing Taiwan independence and U.S./ally intervention – extensive A2/AD capabilities (anti-ship missiles, advanced submarines) to dominate the Western Pacific littoral. Rapidly building a blue-water navy (aircraft carriers, destroyers) to protect sea lanes and Chinese interests abroad. Modernizing nuclear forces (silo construction) for a more credible second-strike by 2030+. No formal alliances; relies on growing power to dissuade neighbors from aligning against it (e.g. economic leverage over ASEAN). Emphasizes “active defense” doctrine – asserts that its military rise is defensive, but its assertive actions (militarizing SCS islands, border clashes with India) send mixed signals. Increasing power projection: first overseas base in Djibouti, regular far-seas naval exercises. By 2049, seeks a “world-class” military on par with the U.S..

High-risk assertiveness to reclaim influence. Willing to use force unilaterally (Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2014/2022) – sees NATO as existential threat. Relies on nuclear deterrence as ultimate backstop; openly brandishes nuclear threats when cornered. Conventional forces sizable but mixed effectiveness (Ukraine war exposed weaknesses in logistics and morale). Maintains strong capabilities in its near abroad and specialized areas (Arctic warfare, tank and artillery massing). Security strategy includes hybrid warfare – cyber hacks, election meddling, mercenaries (Wagner in Africa/Mideast) to achieve aims below direct war threshold. Has security treaties in CSTO but those are limited; instead aligns informally with regimes like Iran, Syria. Conducts joint drills with China (naval patrols, bomber flights) as a show of solidarity. Military spending and industrial base under strain due to sanctions, forcing Russia to draw down stockpiles and seek munitions from partners (e.g. drones from Iran).

Climate & Sustainability

Back as a climate leader with Paris reentry. Committed to 50–52% cut by 2030 (vs 2005) and net-zero by 2050. Implementing major policies (IRA 2022) to transition to clean energy and electric vehicles domestically. Internationally, pledged climate finance and leads initiatives like the Global Methane Pledge. Faces political oscillation risk (some U.S. factions resist climate regulation). Still a top oil & gas producer; balancing energy security with decarbonization (e.g. promoting LNG exports while also funding renewables). Overall, aiming to align climate action with economic opportunity – “green growth” narrative.

Largest current emitter but also largest renewables builder. Pledged peak CO₂ by 2030, carbon neutrality by 2060. Investing heavily in solar, wind, EVs – dominates many clean tech supply chains. Simultaneously expanding coal power in short term for energy security, which complicates trajectory. Uses narrative of “common but differentiated responsibilities” – expects developed nations to do more and provide tech/finance. Pushing “ecological civilization” domestically: improved air quality, reforestation, and launch of a carbon market. BRI starting to go greener (stopped funding overseas coal plants). At climate summits, positions itself as leader of developing world interests, but its sheer scale means China’s actions greatly determine global outcomes.

Low ambition, fossil-dependent. NDC is a modest 30% cut by 2030 from 1990 (easily met due to 90s economic collapse). Long-term net-zero 2060 goal announced but with little roadmap. Continues to rely on oil, gas, coal revenues – energy strategy plans to increase fossil fuel output through 2035. Climate policy often minimal: slow renewables growth, limited efficiency measures. Reluctant on climate finance – contributes almost nothing extra. However, does tout role of its vast forests as carbon sinks and is developing nuclear/hydro which help limit domestic emissions. Geopolitically, has used its fossil fuels as leverage (benefiting in short term from Europe’s gas crisis) but risks long-term market loss as world shifts green. Viewed as a climate laggard, with policies rated “critically insufficient” for 1.5°C goals.

Key Takeaways: The United States, China, and Russia each envision a world that best suits their interests, leading to distinct strategies. The U.S. largely seeks to preserve the prevailing order (while updating it to tackle new issues like climate and tech governance), the China seeks to evolve the order toward one where it is co-equal if not dominant, and Russia strives to upend aspects of the order to regain lost influence. Economically and technologically, the U.S. and China are in fierce competition, whereas Russia leverages its natural resources and military as its primary cards. In terms of overlaps, all three acknowledge transnational challenges like terrorism and (to varying degrees) climate change, and all three engage (at least nominally) in multilateral institutions (UN Security Council, G20) – so there remains some diplomatic space for cooperation or at least managing frictions. Yet, their differences in values and goals are stark: the U.S. promotes democratic governance and a free-market, open internet vision; China offers an authoritarian capitalist model and guarded internet sovereignty; Russia presents a nationalist, revisionist stance often tied to nostalgia for great-power dominance and conservative social norms. These differences manifest in tensions – from Ukraine’s battlefields to trade wars to tech embargoes – making the current global landscape one of heightened strategic rivalry. Managing these rivalries while advancing common interests (like sustainable development and avoiding catastrophic conflict) is the central international challenge as of 2025.

Sources:

• United Nations, “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” 2015.
• UN Secretary-General António Guterres, SDG Progress Report (Special Edition) remarks, Apr. 2023 – noting only 12% of SDG targets on track and over 30% in reverse.
• White House, U.S. National Security Strategy 2022 (Fact Sheet) – “We will effectively compete with the PRC… while constraining a dangerous Russia.”.
• Report to the 20th CPC Congress (Oct. 2022) – China has “stood firm against hegemonism… advocated true multilateralism,” increasing its influence and aiming for a greater role in global governance.
• TASS (Russian news agency), Highlights of Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept – Russia sees itself as a “distinct civilization” and seeks to “eliminate the dominance” of the U.S.-led West.
• Reuters, “China has signed BRI documents with 150+ countries, ~\$1 trillion invested over decade,” Sept. 2023; and “G7’s \$600 billion PGII to rival Belt and Road,” Sept. 2023.
• White House, “FACT SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act 2022” – investing in semiconductors and R\&D to “keep the US the leader in industries of tomorrow (AI, quantum, clean tech)”.
• CPC 20th Congress report – “mobilize resources to make key technological breakthroughs… achieve breakthroughs in core technologies in key fields”.
• Reuters, “China’s 2022 trade with Russia hit record ¥1.28 trn (\$190 bn)” (up as EU trade fell due to sanctions).
• White House, “President Biden’s Leaders Summit on Climate 2021 (Fact Sheet)” – “U.S. will target reducing emissions by 50–52% by 2030 vs 2005”.
• Climate Change News, “Xi Jinping: China will aim for carbon neutrality by 2060”, UNGA 2020 – China to “peak emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.”.
• Carbon Brief, “Russia to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 – Putin,” Oct. 2021 – “Russia will… seek carbon neutrality by no later than 2060,” and acknowledging need to reduce oil and coal use.
• Climate Action Tracker – Russia’s 2030 target is a 30% cut below 1990 (incl. forests), rated “Highly insufficient” as it allows emissions to rise and reflects “minimal action”.